Comments: Crawford v. Washington: Redefining Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence; The Impact across the United States and in Maryland by Perrick, Tracey L.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 1 Fall 2005 Article 5
2005
Comments: Crawford v. Washington: Redefining
Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence; The Impact
across the United States and in Maryland
Tracey L. Perrick
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Perrick, Tracey L. (2005) "Comments: Crawford v. Washington: Redefining Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence; The Impact across the
United States and in Maryland," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 35: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol35/iss1/5
CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON: REDEFINING SIXTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE; THE IMPACT ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 
AND IN MARYLAND 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly one-third of American women report being physically or sex-
ually abused by a husband or boyfriend at some point in their lives,l 
while in 2003, an estimated 960,000 American children were deter-
mined to be victims of child abuse or neglect. 2 When the Supreme 
Court handed down its decision in Crawford v. Washington3 on March 
8, 2004, it "redirected the course of admissible hearsay in light of the 
[Sixth Amendment] Confrontation Clause,"4 and the Sixth Amend-
ment became a possible source of greater protection to those criminal 
defendants that are accused of committing domestic violence or abus-
ing children. In an attempt to bring Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
back to that which the Framers had intended, the Crawford Court held 
that under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, where "testi-
monial" evidence is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted5 
against a criminal defendant, the witness must either testify at trial or 
be unavailable, and the defendant must have had a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine that witness. 6 
However, the Court failed to articulate a firm definition of "testimo-
nial,"7 thereby bestowing courts across the country with the duty of 
1. KAREN SCOTT COLLINS, ET AL., HEALTH CONCERNS ACROSS A WOMAN'S LIFES-
PAN: THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1998 SURVEY OF WOMEN'S HEALTH 8 
(1999), available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Healthconcerns_sur-
veyreport. pdf. 
2. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFORMATION, 
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2003: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 1 (2005), http:// 
nccanch.acf.hhs.gov / pubs/factsheets/ cans tats. pdf. 
3. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
4. Allie Phillips, Weathering the Storm after Crawford v. Washington (Part 1 of 2), 
UPDATE (Am. Prosecutors Research Inst. Nat'l Ctr. for the Prosecution of 
Child Abuse, Alexandria, Va.) (2004), http://www.ndaa-apri.org/publica-
tions/newsletters/update_volume_17 _number_5_2004.html. "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted 
with witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment 
was applied to the states via the 14th Amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400 (1965). 
5. "The [Confrontation] Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial state-
ments for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter as-
serted." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. 
6. [d. at 68. Some states have also codified the common law doctrine of forfei-
ture by wrongdoing, eliminating such requirements. See discussion infra 
Parts I1LB. and IV., as well as notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
7. [d. 
133 
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determining exactly what constitutes testimonial evidence. Since the 
Crawford Court left such questions unanswered, those courts must also 
determine the extent of Crawforas impact in child and domestic abuse 
cases - at least in the immediate future. The enduring impact of Craw-
ford, however, in domestic and child abuse cases is still unknown. 
In Maryland, a convicted child sex offender was granted a new trial 
based on the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Crawford.8 As a result, 
the Maryland Tender Years Statute, which allows for certain health 
professionals' courtroom testimony in lieu of a child abuse victim's 
testimony, based on particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, is no 
longer a powerful tool for child abuse prosecutors. Spurned by such 
Crawford ramifications, there were initially three Victim and Witness 
Intimidation bills before the Maryland legislature designed to codify 
the common law rule of forfeiture, potentially making it easier for 
prosecutors to again get out-of-court statements admitted against a 
criminal defendant without Crawford acting as a barrier.9 Recently, the 
Maryland General Assembly codified the common law rule of forfei-
ture, adopting a statute that incorporates by reference Maryland Rule 
5-804.10 However, the Maryland statute is more restrictive than the 
federal rule, the original rule proposed by the Rules Committee, as 
well as many other state's statutes. ll 
Clearly, the ramifications of Crawford v. Washington extend beyond 
domestic and child abuse prosecutions, yet this Comment will specifi-
cally focus on the short and long-term impacts12 of Crawford in the 
prosecution of those cases where victims repeatedly "recant and refuse 
to testify, invoke a privilege, or cannot testify at trial, primarily domes-
tic abuse and child abuse prosecutions."13 
Specifically, Part II.A will discuss the pre-Crawford analysis of a crimi-
nal defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. Part 
Il.B will examine the Crawford decision in depth, in order to explore 
the historical reasoning of the Court's decision and its exact ramifica-
tions. Part IlI.A will evaluate how courts are currently defining testi-
8. Snowden v. State, 385 Md. 64,867 A.2d 314 (2005). 
9. See infra discussion Part IV. 
lO. 6A LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL § 804(6):1 
(2005 Supp.). The statute is codified as MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. 
§ 10-901 (2005). Notably, Maryland Rule 5-804 is the "corollary" to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (6), the rule that codifies the forfei ture by wrong-
doing doctrine. McLain, supra at § 804(6):1. 
11. McLain, supra note 10, at § 804(6):1. See also discussion infra Part IV. 
12. Terms used in Adam M. Krischer, ThoughJustice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stu-
pid: Applying Common Sense to Crawford v. Washington in Domestic Violence 
Cases, The Voice (Am. Prosecutors Research Inst.'s Violence Against Wo-
men Program, Alexandria, Va.), Nov. 2004, at 1, 2-3, available at http:// 
www.ndaa-aprLorg/pdf/the_voice_vol_l_issue_l.pdf. 
13. Professor Lynn McLain, 'What Hath Crawford Wrought?", A Panel Discus-
sion at the University of Baltimore School of Law 2 (Nov. 3, 2004) (tran-
script on file with author). 
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monial under Crawford in domestic violence and child abuse 
prosecutions, also specifically examining the relevant Maryland case, 
Snowden v. State. 14 Part III.B will discuss a possible long-term solution 
to combat the effects of the Crawford decision in domestic violence 
and child abuse prosecutions: the forfeiture by wrongdoing common 
law exception to the Confrontation Clause. Part IV will examine how 
Maryland has codified this common law exception, and will further 
argue that while this is a desirable solution in light of Crawford, Mary-
land's statute is too restrictive. Finally, Part V concludes that while the 
exact ramifications of Crawford in domestic and child abuse cases are 
not yet known, the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception may prove to 
be a worthy solution to admitting what is now considered testimonial 
evidence. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Ohio v. Roberts15 
1. "[S] ufficient 'indicia of reliability">16 
Before Crawford, courts used reliability as the standard to determine 
admissibility of out-of-court statements against the criminally accused. 
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court had to decide whether, under the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause, a witness's preliminary hearing 
testimony is admissible hearsay in a criminal trial if the witness is not 
produced at trial. 17 Respondent Herschel Roberts was convicted of 
forgery and possession of stolen credit cards. 18 In its case-in-chief, the 
prosecution had relied on the preliminary hearing testimony of wit-
ness Anita Isaacs to rebut the respondent'S assertion that Isaacs had 
given him the checks and credit cards.19 While the Court recognized 
the importance of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
literally "face" his or her accuser, it also noted that "competing inter-
ests ... may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial."20 In act-
ing as a barrier to the admission of hearsay, the Roberts Court 
concluded that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause instructs 
that a witness be shown to be "unavailable" for cross-examination at 
trial. 21 Then, the witnesses' statement is admissible only if the state-
14. 156 Md. App. 139, 846 A.2d 36 (2004), affd, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 
(2005). 
15. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
16. [d. at 68 (quoting standard applied in Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 
(1972)) . 
17. 448 U.S. at 58. 
18. [d. at 58, 60. 
19. [d. at 59. The State relied on OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 "which per-
mits the use of preliminary examination testimony of a witness who 'cannot 
for any reason be produced at trial.'" [d.; See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 2945.49 (West 1997). 
20. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64 (citation omitted). 
21. [d. at 66. 
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ment "bears [an] 'adequate indicia of reliability.' "22 The Court went 
on to explain that" [r] eliability can be inferred without more in a case 
"where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,"23 
or upon a "showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."24 
In reaching its holding, the Court found that Anita Isaacs' prelimi-
nary hearing testimony "bore sufficient 'indicia of reliability,' "25 anal-
ogous to the witness in California v. Green. 26 In Green, the Court found 
that a witness's preliminary testimony was admissible even though he 
was unavailable at trial because his statement had "been given under 
circumstances closely approximating those that surround the typical 
trial. "27 Similar to the finding of admissibility in Green, the Court held 
that the questioning by Roberts' counsel during the preliminary hear-
ing "clearly partook of cross-examination as a matter of form," in that 
counsel obviously attacked Anita Isaacs' testimony and its truthful-
ness.28 Because Roberts' counsel had, and seized, the opportunity to 
cross-examine Anita Isaacs, Isaacs' testimony had adequate "indicia of 
reliability" and was admissible.29 
B. Crawford v. Washington30 
1. Before Reaching the Supreme Court: Reliability as the Standard 
Although Michael Crawford's wife, Sylvia Crawford, did not testify at 
his trial for assault and attempted murder, as she relied on the state 
marital privilege that generally barred one spouse from testifying 
against the other without the other's consent, the State was permitted 
to introduce a tape of her statements to police, implicating her hus-
band in the crime.31 The trial court, invoking and applying Ohio v. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. The Roberts Court cited dying declarations, cross-examined prior trial 
testimony, and properly administered business and public records as those 
hearsay exceptions that "rest upon such solid foundations" that they are 
"firmly rooted hearsay exception[s]." Id. at 66 n.8. 
24. Id. at 66. Such "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" are based on 
the circumstances attendant to the making of the statement and not based 
on corroborative extrinsic evidence. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 
(1990). 
25. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 68. 
26. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
27. Id. at 165. The specific factors the court relied on were that the witness was 
under oath, the respondent was represented by the same counsel at trial, 
the respondent had opportunities to cross-examine the witness as to his 
statements at the preliminary hearing, and the preliminary hearing was 
before a tribunal and on the record. Id. 
28. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-71 (emphasis in original). 
29. Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972)). 
30. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
31. Id. at 40. According to Washington law, even though Crawford's wife 
claimed her marital privilege, the privilege does "not extend to a spouse's 
out-of-court statements admissible under a hearsay exception." Id. at 40; see 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (West 1995). The State, therefore, 
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Roberts,32 held that Sylvia Crawford's statement bore "adequate 'indicia 
of reliability'" because it was "trustworthy."33 Reversing the trial court, 
the Washington Court of Appeals employed a nine-factor test to deter-
mine the trustworthiness of Sylvia Crawford's statement, ultimately 
finding her statement was not trustworthy.34 The Washington Su-
preme Court reinstated the conviction, finding that Sylvia Crawford's 
statement was trustworthy, based on its "interlocking" nature with the 
defendant's statement.35 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine whether the use of Sylvia Crawford's statement at her hus-
band's trial violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
right. 36 
2. Supreme Court Analysis: A Historical Examination of the Con-
frontation Clause in England 
The Court began its analysis stating that the text of the U.S. Consti-
tution is not enough; that a thorough study of the history of the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause was required in order to make a 
proper ruling.37 
First examining early English law, the Court articulated that "conti-
nental civil law" was often utilized when adjudicating "the manner in 
was able to argue the "statements against penal interest" hearsay exception 
because in Crawford's wife's statements to police she admitted to facilitat-
ing the assault, and these statements indicated her husband did not stab 
the victim in self-defense. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
32. 448 U.S. 56. 
33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). In particular, the 
trial court found Sylvia Crawford's statement was trustworthy because the 
statement corroborated Michael Crawford's story, she had "direct knowl-
edge as an eyewitness," it was a description of "recent events," and a "neu-
tral law enforcement officer" did the questioning. Id. 
34. Id. at 41. In contrast to the trial court, the court of appeals articulated 
several reasons as to why Sylvia Crawford's statements did not bear "particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. For example, her statement 
"contradicted one she had previously given [,] it was made in response to 
specific questions," and she "admitted she had shut her eyes during the 
stabbing." Id. Most importantly, the court of appeals held that Sylvia Craw-
ford's statement "differed on the issue crucial to petitioner's self-defense 
claim," that is, whether the victim had anything in his hand when stabbed 
by Crawford. Id. 
35. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 664 (Wash. 2002). Specifically, "'when a 
codefendant's confession is virtually identical [Le., interlocks] to that of a 
defendant, it may be deemed reliable.'" [d. at 663 (alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416, 427 (Wash. 1993». Because the state-
ments of both Michael Crawford and his wife were unclear as to whether 
the victim had a weapon in his hand, the court held an "omission by both 
that interlocks the statements ... makes Sylvia's statement reliable." Id. at 
664. 
36. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
37. Id. at 42-43. The Court noted that the "right to confront one's accusers is a 
concept that dates back to Roman times," but the right as known and un-
derstood today dates to English common law. Id. at 43. 
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which witnesses give testimony in criminal trials."38 Importantly, conti-
nental civil law "condone[d] examination in private by judicial of-
ficers."39 Justices of the Peace would often conduct civil law 
examinations, which were basically, pretrial examinations of witnesses 
and suspects.40 Such pretrial examinations became routine during 
Queen Mary's reign, and these examinations were commonly used as 
evidence in lieu of live testimony.41 
Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason in 1603 is one of the most fa-
mous uses of civil-law examination.42 At Raleigh's trial, for purposes of 
recitation to the jury, the court admitted the out-of-court examination 
of, and letter written by, Raleigh's alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, 
inculpating Raleigh.43 In response, "Raleigh argued that Cobham had 
lied to save himself' and "demanded that the judges call him to ap-
pear" so he could '''[c]all [his] accuser before [his] face."'44 The 
judges did not allow Lord Cobham to appear at Raleigh's trial, and 
Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death.45 
The trial of Sir Walter Raleigh served as an impetus in England for 
"statutory and judicial reforms" to English law.46 In particular, the 
courts solidified the rule that a witness must be "demonstrably unavail-
able to testify in person" before an out-of-court examination will be 
admissible.47 Moreover, in King v. Paine, an English court concluded 
that the "admissibility of an unavailable witness's pretrial examina-
tion" hinges on whether the right of the accused to cross-examine that 
witness has been satisfied.48 
3. Supreme Court Analysis: A Historical Examination of the Con-
frontation Clause in the Colonies 
The Crawfard Court noted that England was not the only sovereign 
to employ troublesome witness examination practices.49 As a result, 
many colonial states adopted declarations of rights that guaranteed 
38. [d. 
39. [d. Later on, English law would adopt a "common law" approach to witness 
testimony at trials, which has a "tradition ... of live testimony in court 
subject to adversarial testing." Id. 
40. [d. 
41. [d. at 43-44. 
42. [d. at 44. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. (quoting Raleigh's Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1,15-16 (1603». 
45. [d. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. at 45. 
48. [d. (citing King v. Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (1696». "[B]y 1791 (the year 
the Sixth Amendment was ratified), courts were applying the cross-exami-
nation rule even to examinations by justices of the peace in felony cases." 
[d. at 46. 
49. [d. at 47. For example, "[a] decade before the Revolution, England gave 
jurisdiction over Stamp Act offenses to the admiralty courts, which followed 
civil-law rather than common-law procedures and thus routinely took testi-
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the right to confrontation.50 Moreover, as the right of confrontation 
evolved from colonial interpretations of English common law, it be-
came clear that confrontation was an important and highly protected 
Sixth Amendment right.51 
The Crawford Court also cited the case of State v. Webb, in which the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that "depositions could be 
read against an accused only if they were taken in his presence."52 
Additionally, the majority noted that many other nineteenth century 
cases affirmed the admissibility of prior testimony only if there was a 
previous opportunity for the cross-examination by the accused.53 
4. Supreme Court Analysis: Recognizing the Present Meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
Adhering to its stated goal to interpret the Sixth Amendment within 
the context of how the Framers viewed it, the Crawford majority deter-
mined that English and colonial history "supports two inferences 
about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment."54 
First, the Court articulated the inference that the "principal evil at 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of 
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as 
evidence against the accused."55 Specifically, notorious cases such as 
Sir Walter Raleigh's served as the stimulus for the English common 
law's right to confrontation and adoption of this notion by the Ameri-
can colonials.56 As a result, the Crawford Court vowed to make its in-
terpretation of the Sixth Amendment with "this focus in mind."57 
The Court recognized that not all out-of-court testimony, or hear-
say, triggers a Sixth Amendment analysis; for example, an "off-hand 
... remark" might be disallowed under hearsay rules, but is not a 
concern of Sixth Amendment.58 Thus, the Court focused on the text 
of the Sixth Amendment, which gives the accused a right to confront 
"'witnesses,'" or, as the Court declares, those who "'bear testi-
mony.' "59 Defining" 'testimony'" as "'a solemn declaration or affirma-












mony by deposition or private judicial examination." Id. at 47-48. Colonial 
representatives protested these types of practices. Id. at 48. 
Id. Notably, "[t]he First Congress ... include[d] the Confrontation Clause 
in the proposal that later became the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 49. 
Id. 
Id. (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 103 (N.C. 1794». 
Id. at 50. 
Id. at 42-43, 50. 
Id. at 50. 
See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
Id. at 51. 
Id. (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1970) (1828». 
Id. (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 59). 
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the Court concluded that the text of the Sixth Amendment, along 
with its common-law historical evolution "reflects an especially acute 
concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement,"61 that is, those 
statements which are testimonial.62 
While the Court failed to reach an articulable definition of what 
constitutes testimonial statements, it did find certain types of out-of-
court statements unequivocally, regardless of any adopted definition, 
testimonial.63 Those statements are: ex parte testimony at a prelimi-
nary hearing,64 statements taken by police officers in the course of 
interrogations,65 grand jury testimony,66 prior trial testimony,67 and 
plea allocutions.68 
Because the Crawford Court held that Sylvia Crawford's out-of-court 
statement to the police officer was clearly testimonial, it stated it did 
not need to further define what else is testimonial.69 However, the 
majority did refer to three possible formulations as to what constitutes 
testimonial evidence. One position is that previously advocated by Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas, defining testimonial as "'extrajudicial state-
ments ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.' "70 Arguably 
more elastic is the position argued by Crawford's lawyers, that testimo-
nial statements are "[ e] x parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent - that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examina-
tions, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, 
or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect 
to be used prosecutorially."71 Finally, obviously the most flexible posi-
tion is that articulated by the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers, defining testimonial as "statements that were made 
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial.,,72 Nevertheless, the Court was clear in its refusal to adopt any 
particular definition of testimonial. 
61. [d. In distinguishing what the types of statements the right to confrontation 
is concerned with, the Court emphasized that "[a]n accuser who makes a 
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a 
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not." [d. 
62. [d. 
63. [d. at 52, 6S. 
64. [d. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. at 6S. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. at 64 (citing United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d lOIS, 1022 (9th Cir. 
2002». This determination will be critical as the lower courts across the 
country attempt to categorize evidence as testimonial or non-testimonial. 
See infra Part lILA. 
69. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 6S. 
70. [d. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992». 
71. [d. at 51. 
72. [d. at 52. 
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The Court found that the second historically-based inference re-
garding the meaning of the Sixth Amendment was that "[t]he Fram-
ers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a 
witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testifY, 
and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination. "73 
In support of its contention that the Confrontation Clause requires 
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine when deter-
mining the admissibility of testimonial evidence of witnesses absent 
from trial, the Crawford majority relied upon prior case law 
consistency. 74 
5. Supreme Court Analysis: Overruling Ohio v. Roberts75 
While the results under preceding case law may protect the histori-
cal goals of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the majority 
in Crawford definitively asserted that the Roberts test determining the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence76 is both too broad and too narrow.77 
Instead of allowing a 'jury to hear evidence, untested by the adver-
sary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability,"78 
the Court averred that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 







Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added). Importantly, the only exceptions to the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right are those hearsay exceptions 
that existed at common law. Specifically, the majority asserted that business 
records, statements by coconspirators during and in furtherance of a con-
spiracy, and "casual remark[s]" are "by their nature" non-testimonial. Id. at 
56, 51. Regarding dying declarations, the Court chose "not [to] decide ... 
whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dy-
ing declarations." Id. at 56 n.6. 
Id. at 55-58. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73 (1980) (admitting 
preliminary hearing testimony because the defendant's counsel had, and 
took, the opportunity to cross-examine the witness); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 
U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (holding that because "there was an adequate oppor-
tunity" for the defendant to cross-examine the witness at the first trial, and 
because the defendant "availed himself of that opportunity," the testimony 
of the unavailable witness was admissible at defendant's second trial); Bar-
ber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968) (excluding testimony given at a 
preliminary hearing because the witness was not proven to be unavailable). 
448 U.S. 56. 
The Roberts test "conditions the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on 
whether it falls under a 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' or bears 'particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness.'" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (quoting 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). 
Id. Specifically, it is too broad in that it "applies the same mode of analysis 
whetFter or not the hearsay consist of ex parte testimony ... result[ing] in 
close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core 
concerns of the Clause." Id. Moreover, the test is too narrow because" [i] t 
admits statements that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding 
of reliability ... fail [ing] to protect against paradigmatic confrontation vio-
lations." Id. 
Id. at 62. 
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sessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-exam-
ination."79 To illustrate the problems of the Roberts reliability test, the 
Court examined its progeny. 
To begin, the Court described the reliability test as "amorphous," 
because "[w]hether a statement is deemed reliable depends heavily 
on which factors the judge considers and how much weight he ac-
cords to each of them."80 But more importantly, the Crawford Court 
found issue with the Roberts test because of its "demonstrated capacity 
to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause 
plainly meant to exclude."81 
6. Supreme Court Analysis: The End Result 
As recognized by the Court, Crawford, in and of itself, is illustrative 
of the inherent constitutional and applicability problems that arise be-
cause of the Roberts test.82 In fact, all three Washington state courts 
relied on different reliability factors to determine whether to admit Syl-
via Crawford's statement.83 Moreover, such a vague reliability standard 
79. Id. at 61. In reaching this conclusion, the CrawfMd Court relied on its rea-
soning that" [a] dmitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is funda-
mentally at odds with the right of confrontation." Id. The right of 
confrontation, is a "procedural rather than a substantive guarantee." Id. 
Importantly, the Court distinguished the Roberts reliability test from excep-
tions to the Confrontation Clause, such as forfeiture by wrongdoing, which 
"extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; [be-
cause] it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining relia-
bility." Id. at 62. The Court's acceptance of the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
hearsay exception will possibly have critical implications to the impact of 
domestic and child abuse prosecutions under CrawfMd. See infra Part III.B. 
80. CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 63. To support its point, the Court cited the People v. 
Farrell eight-factor balancing test. 34 P.3d 401, 406-07 (Colo. 2001). It also 
pointed to the fact that courts "wind up attaching the same significance to 
opposite facts." CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 63. For example, in Nowlin v. Virginia, 
the court "found a statement more reliable because the witness was in cus-
tody and charged with a crime." Id. (citing Nowlin, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-72 
(Va. Ct. App. 2003». In contrast, in State v. Bintz, the "Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals found a statement more reliable because the witness was not in 
custody and not a suspect." CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 63 (citing Bintz, 650 
N.W.2d 913,917 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002». 
81. CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 63. The Court found, for example, "accomplice con-
fessions implicating the accused" were routinely admitted. Id. at 64. Moreo-
ver, it pointed to the admission of plea allocutions, grand jury testimony, 
and prior trial testimony, as other "sorts of plainly testimonial statements" 
admitted based on the Roberts test, "despite the absence of any opportunity 
to cross-examine." Id. at 64-65. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 
1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (plea allocution admitted); United States v. 
Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1118 (8th Cir. 2000) (grand jury testimony admit-
ted); State v. McNeill, 537 S.E.2d 518,524 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (prior trial 
testimony admitted). 
82. CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 65-66. 
83. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. Moreover, "[e]ach of the 
courts also made assumptions that cross-examination might well have un-
dermined." CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 66. For example, the Washington trial 
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is not what the Framers had in mind, as illustrated in their adoption of 
English common law, not civil law, principles. In the Court's view, 
therefore, resolving Crawford based on the Roberts reliability test would 
be in conflict with the historical purpose behind the Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause.84 
Therefore, in accordance with what the common law required, the 
Court held that" [w] here testimonial evidence is at issue ... the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability 
and a prior opportunity for cross-examination."85 Yet, the Court 
"Ie [ft] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive defini-
tion of 'testimonial.' "86 
Applying its articulated standard to the facts of Crawford and finding 
Sylvia Crawford's statement was clearly testimonial, due to the fact that 
defendant Michael Crawford had no opportunity, either at trial or 
before, to cross-examine Sylvia Crawford and because she was unavail-
able due to marital privilege, the Court ruled that the admission of 
her testimonial statement was in violation of the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause.87 
While the impact of Crawford promises to be far-reaching, two criti-
cal areas it seems to affect negatively are domestic abuse and child 
abuse prosecutions, where it is common for a victim to retract previ-
ous statements and refuse to testify, invoke a privilege, or be simply 
terrified to testify. In domestic abuse and child abuse cases, prosecu-
tors must often rely on various forms of the victim's out-of-court state-
ments as the crux of the case.88 Now, in light of Crawford, if such 
statements are deemed testimonial, and the defendant has not been 
court found the Sylvia Crawford statement reliable because she was an eye-
witness to the crime. Id. Nevertheless, Sylvia Crawford also admitted shut-
ting her eyes at one point. Id. Therefore, only cross-examination could 
truly reveal Sylvia's true reliability as an eyewitness. 
84. Id. at 67-68. "The Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining the 
reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and we, no less than the state 
courts, lack the authority to replace it with one of our own devising." [d. at 
67. 
85. Id. at 68. Notably, "[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly 
consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their 
development of hearsay law, ... and ... [the] exempt[ion] of such state-
ments from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). Indicating Roberts as an example, the Court seemed to imply that the 
Roberts reliability test is still good law in determining the admissibility of 
non-testimonial evidence. Id. at 63. 
86. Id. at 68. 
87. Id. 
88. Adam M. Krischer, "Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid": Applying 
Common Sense to Crawford v. Washington in Domestic Violence Cases, The 
Voice (Am. Prosecutors Research Inst. 's Violence Against Women Program, 
Alexandria, Va.), Nov. 2004, at 1, 1, available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/ 
pdf/ the_ voice_ vol_1_issue_1. pdf. 
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afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the victim, all of the vic-
tim's out-of-court statements are inadmissible evidence. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Crawford's Short Term Impact: How courts are defining "testimonial" 
evidence frequently used in domestic and child abuse prosecution 
1. Domestic Violence 
"Domestic violence is one of the most difficult crimes to prosecute" 
due to internal and external pressures on the victim and obstacles 
with evidence, or the lack thereof.89 As one South Bronx public de-
fender stated: "[0] ne of the peculiar realities of domestic violence 
cases is that - abused or not - the complaining witnesses often 
don't want their loved ones prosecuted."90 In order to manage this 
very issue, state prosecutors turned to "evidence based prosecution," 
whereby a "prosecutor proves his or her case with evidence other than 
the victim's testimony."91 
Legal professionals seem divided on the issue of whether Crawford 
will have a detrimental impact on domestic violence prosecutions. 
Many legal experts exhort similar arguments to those of attorney 
Adam M. Krischer; that is, that the Crawford decision "threatens to re-
move this tool [of evidence based prosecution] from the hands of 
prosecutors across the country."92 In contrast, other legal profession-
als assert that Crawford "should have little effect on the day-ta-day trials 
seen in domestic violence courts in other [sic] states around the na-
tion."93 In light of the divided stance of professionals, an examination 
of how courts across the country are ruling on evidence typically uti-
lized in domestic violence cases will provide the best way to assess the 
impact of Crawford. 
Even if the victim in a domestic violence prosecution refuses to tes-
tify at trial for the prosecution, if he or she testifies for the defense, 
there is no Confrontation Clause issue.94 This is because the victim 
has made him or herself available for confrontation.95 
89. Id. 
90. David Feige, Domestic Silence: The Supreme Court Kills E,vidence-Based Prosecu-
tion, SLATE, Mar. 12, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2097041. 
91. Krischer, supra note 88, at 1. 
92. Id. 
93. Amy Karan & David Gersten, Domestic Violence Hearsay Exceptions in the Wake 
a/Crawford v. Washington: A View/rom the Bench, SYNERGY (Nat'l Council of 
Juvenile and Family CourtJudges, Reno, Nev.), Summer 2004, at 1, 3 availa-
ble at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/DVHearsayExceptionsWakeCrawford. 
pdf. 
94. See State v. Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that even though the victim's tape-recorded statement to police was testi-
monial, because the victim testified at trial for the defense, her pretrial 
statement was properly admitted). 
95. Krischer, supra note 88, at 6. 
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Calls to 911 are an extremely common form of hearsay evidence 
sought to be introduced in domestic violence prosecutions.96 In People 
v. Moscat,97 the New York Criminal Court recognized that after Craw-
ford, "the relevant inquiry ... is whether a 911 call for help is testimo-
nial in nature."98 In answering its question, the court held that the 911 
call at issue in the case was not testimonial, stating that "a 911 call for 
help is not 'testimonial' in nature ... provided that it meets the re-
quirements for an 'excited utterance' or other exception to the hear-
say rule."99 The court found that the 911 call at issue was clearly an 
excited utterance, therefore, non-testimonial. lOo Specifically, the call 
was not generated by law enforcement or the state to seek prosecution 
for a crime; rather it was initiated by a victim of a crime in need of 
immediate assistance. lOI Moreover, "testimonial" contemplates that 
the government sought out the witness to testify for the prosecution, 
while a 911 call is a victim/witness seeking the government's help.102 
Thus, the court concluded that 911 calls are clearly "not equivalent to 
a formal pretrial examination" the Confrontation Clause was meant to 
protect against. 103 Other courts have reached the same view as the 
Moscat Court, finding that 911 calls are excited utterances and there-
fore non-testimonial. 104 
In contrast, other courts have found 911 calls testimonial. The New 
York Supreme Court, in People v. Cortes,l°5 upheld the holding of the 
trial court that the 911 tape of an unidentified caller reporting an 
alleged crime was clearly testimonial, based on the rationale that 
96. People v. Moscat, 777 N'y.S.2d 875, 878 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (discussing 
evidence used in domestic violence prosecutions, the court stated that 
"[p] erhaps the most common form of such evidence is a call for help made 
by a woman to 911"). See also Karan & Gersten, supra note 93, at 3. 
97. 777 N'y.S.2d 875. 
98. Id. at 879. 
99. Id. at 880. 
100. Id. 
10l. Id. at 879. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 880. 
lO4. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 830 n.22 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that the victim's 911 call the night before her murder, indicating the defen-
dant as the perpetrator, was non-testimonial because the victim initiated 
contact with the police, sought the assistance of the police, and was not 
being interrogated); People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Ct. App. 
2004) (The court found the assault victim's 911 telephone call was non-
testimonial because it was not given in response to police interrogation or 
police questioning. Moreover, the victim, not the police, initiated the 911 
call to request assistance.); People v. Conyers, 777 N'y.S.2d 274, 277 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2004) (The court held holding that the witness to an assault in-
tended to call 911 to stop the assault that was in progress, not to initiate 
future criminal proceedings against the defendant. Thus, the witness's 
statements in her 911 call were not "testimonial;" rather, they were "excited 
utterances.") . 
105. 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
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"[w]hen a 911 call is made to report a crime and supply information 
about the circumstances and the people involved, the purpose of the 
information is for investigation, prosecution, and potential use at a 
judicial proceeding .... "106 Because the call was "for the purpose of 
invoking police action and the prosecutorial process"107 it "is the mod-
ern equivalent, made possible by technology, to the depositions taken 
by magistrates ... under the Marian committal statute."108 Other 
courts have followed the same logic set forth by the Cortes Court, find-
ing 911 calls testimoniaI,l09 
Seemingly, many courts hold that 911 calls made out of fear or a 
need for immediate help and safety are not testimonial. 110 Conversely, 
911 calls made with the intent to provide information about a crime 
are often deemed testimonial. 11 1 
Statements made to treating medical doctors are also a common 
form of out-of-court hearsay evidence sought to be introduced in do-
mestic violence prosecutions.1l2 The status of a victim's out-of-court 
statements to doctors in domestic violence prosecutions is unclear; 
there are only a few cases thus far addressing the issue of statements to 
medical personnel. Although the case did not involve domestic vio-
lence, a California appeals court held that a stabbing victim's state-
ments to a doctor at a hospital were non-testimonial, therefore, even 
though the victim was unavailable at trial, his statements were admissi-
bleY3 Specifically, the court reasoned that the doctor: 
was not a police officer or even an agent of the police. He 
was not performing any function remotely resembling that of 
a Tudor, Stuart, or Hanoverian justice of the peace. Using 
[the victim's] statement to him against the defendant 'bears 
little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation 
Clause targeted.' 114 
106. Id. at 415. 
107. Id. at 416. 
108. Id. at 415. Such depositions under the Marian committal statute are men-
tioned in Crawford by the majority as part of the history that the Confronta-
tion Clause was meant to guard against. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 43-50 (2004). 
109. See, e.g., State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (The 
court held that the victim's 911 call to report the violation of a no-contact 
order was testimonial in that the victim called 911 to report the incident 
and describe the defendant to the operator, rather than protect herself 
~rom ,~is return. Also, the call was "not 'part of the criminal incident 
ltself. ). 
110. Krischer, supra note 88, at 6. 
111. Id. 
112. Karan & Gersten, supra note 93, at 3. 
113. People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855 (Ct. App. 2004), em. granted and 
depublished fly, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
114. Id. at 854 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51). 
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In contrast, although the case did not involve domestic violence, a 
Colorado appeals court held that the child/victim's statements about 
an alleged abusive incident to a doctor were testimonial and thus 
inadmissible. 115 In particular, the court reached its determination 
based on the facts that the doctor: 
was a member of a child protection team that provide[d] 
consultations at . . . hospitals in cases of suspected child 
abuse. He had previously provided extensive expert testi-
mony in child abuse cases .... [He] elicited the statements 
after consultation with the police, and he necessarily under-
stood that information he obtained would be used in a subse-
quent prosecution for child abuse.116 
Presently, "[s]tatements made to medical personnel appear to be 
non-testimonial" if "they are made out of a desire to seek medical at-
tention rather than in anticipation of future litigation,"117 while seem-
ingly, "[i]f the police are already involved, so that the examination is, 
in a sense, part of the investigation, then statements to [a] doctor are 
testimonial."118 
Lastly, statements made to police are frequently utilized as hearsay 
evidence in domestic violence prosecutions.11 9 It is well established 
that "statements made to police are generally deemed testimonial and 
therefore require confrontation and the right to cross-examine" if 
they are to be admitted as evidence.12o However, beyond statements 
garnered by the police in "interrogation-like" settings, which the Craw-
ford Court envisions in a "colloquial" sense,121 courts have distin-
guished some statements made to police as non-testimonial. 
In Maine, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that a murder victim's 
statements to police were non-testimonial and therefore admissible 
115. People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, No. 
04SC532, 2004 WL 2926003 (Colo. Dec. 20, 2004). 
116. [d. Importantly, the court noted that its finding did not exclude the doctor 
from testifying at pre-trial as to "his observations and physical findings." [d. 
at 266. 
117. Krischer, supra note 88, at 7. See also infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
118. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Crawford v. Washington: Reframing the Right to Confronta-
tion 10, (June 16, 2005), http://www.dwt.com/lawdir/publications/O~ 
05_CrawfordOutline.pdf. See also infra text accompanying note 157. 
119. Karan & Gersten, supra note 93, at 3. 
120. Krischer, supra note 88, at 7. The language in Crawford clearly states that 
"[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are 
also testimonial under even a narrow standard." 541 U.S. 36, 52. Encom-
passed within this analysis, some courts have found, a domestic violence 
victim's application for a protective orders to be testimonial. See People v. 
Thompson, 812 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (wife's written state-
ments in her application for a protective order against her husband/ defen-
dant deemed testimonial); People v. Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499 (Ct. 
App. 2004) (statement of declaration in support of a protective order writ-
ten by victim killed via domestic violence testimonial). 
121. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. 
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without violating the Confrontation Clause. 122 Specifically, the court 
held: 
First, the police did not seek her out. She went to the police 
station on her own ... [sJecond, her statements to them 
were made when she was still under the stress of the alleged 
assault. Any questions posed to her by the police were 
presented in the context of determining why she was dis-
tressed. Third, she was not responding to tactically struc-
tured police questioning as in Crawford, but was instead 
seeking safety and aid . . . Considering all of these facts in 
their context, we conclude that interaction between Barnes's 
mother and the officer was not structured police interroga-
tion triggering the cross-examination requirement of the 
Confrontation Clause as interpreted by the Court in Craw-
ford. Nor did the victim's words in any other way constitute a 
'testimonial' statement. Accordingly, it was not obvious error 
for the court to admit the officer's testimony.123 
Other courts have made similar distinctions regarding statements 
made to police that are not akin to a structured police interroga-
tion. 124 
A cooperative domestic violence victim who is willing to testifY is 
certainly always the preferred choice for prosecutors - even more so 
today, as the victim's in-court testimony renders Crawford a moot point 
at trial. However, the dilemma of unwilling victims will inevitably con-
tinue to arise in domestic violence prosecutions. And with the Court's 
handing down of the Crawford decision, prosecutors must now attempt 
to prove their cases within the evolving boundaries of the new law.125 
Currently, it seems as though "Crawford may make domestic violence 
prosecutions more difficult, but it does not make them impossible."126 
2. Child Abuse 
Similar to domestic violence prosecutions, child abuse prosecutions 
may require proving the case with evidence other than the child's tes-
timony. The type of evidence commonly used, however, can often dif-






State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211 (Me. 2004). 
Id. at 211-12 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51) (footnote omitted). 
See, e.g., People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 856 (Ct. App. 2004) (The 
court found that "Crawford strongly suggested that a hearsay statement is 
not testimonial unless it is made in a relatively formal proceeding that con-
templates a future trial." Therefore, the victim's statement to a police of-
ficer at the hospital, where there was no suspect, "no structured 
questioning," and "no trial ... contemplated," was non-testimonial.) em. 
granted and depublished by, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
The evidence, however, even if non-testimonial, must still pass the Ohio v. 
Roberts reliability standard. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
Krischer, supra note 88, at 10. 
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child abuse in which the child is unavailable to testify, Crawford bars 
the admission of hearsay statements that are 'testimonial' unless the 
defendant was afforded an opportunity of prior cross-examination of 
the witness."127 An examination of how courts across the country are 
ruling on the types of out-of-court hearsay evidence typically utilized 
in child abuse prosecutions will best illustrate Crawford's impact, at 
least in the short-term, in the prosecution of child abuse offenders. 
The forensic interview128 is a common tool utilized by prosecutors 
in place of a child's testimony in an abuse case. While prosecutors will 
argue forensic interviews "are not conducted primarily for the pur-
pose of criminal prosecution"129 and are therefore non-testimonial, 
courts across the country do not seem to agree.130 
Maryland had the opportunity to address the issue of out-of-court 
hearsay evidence commonly utilized in child abuse prosecutions in 
Snowden v. State. 131 Here, the court focused on forensic interview evi-
dence. Specifically, the issue was whether a Maryland statute,132 that 
127. Victor 1. Veith, Keeping the Balance True: Admitting Child Hearsay in the Wake 
of Crawford v. Washington, UPDATE, (Am. Prosecutors Research Inst. Nat'l 
Ctr. for Prosecution of Child Abuse, Alexandria, Va.) (2004), available at 
http:// www.ndaa-apri.org/publications/newsletters/ update_ volume_16_ 
numbec12_2004.html. Crawford does not apply to civil protection pro-
ceedings and criminal proceedings in which the child testifies. Id. 
128. [A] forensic interview[ ] is [the] first step in most child pro-
tective services investigations, one in which a professional inter-
views a child to find out if he or she has been maltreated .... The 
goal of the forensic interview is to obtain a statement from a child 
in an objective, developmentally sensitive, and legally defensible 
manner. 
What is Forensic Interviewing, PRACTICE NOTES (The N.C. Div. of Soc. 
Servs. and the Family and Children's Res. Program, Chapel Hill, N.C.), 
Dec. 2002, available at http://www.practicenotes.org/vol8_no1/whacis. 
htm. 
129. Phillips, supra note 4. Prosecutor Victor Veith asserts that forensic 
interviews: 
[i]f done as part of a multi-disciplinary response to the possi-
bility of abuse ... serve [] the needs of the physicians who may 
treat the child, the therapists who may deal with the child's emo-
tional needs, and the civil child protection professionals who may 
seek to prevent further abuse and even work toward the preserva-
tion of the family. Although the statement may also serve the pur-
poses of the prosecutor at a criminal trial, the interview itself is not 
to focus exclusively or even primarily on the needs of investigators 
or prosecutors. 
Veith, supra note 127. 
130. See infra notes 131-45 and accompanying text. 
131. 156 Md. App. 139, 846 A.2d 36 (2004), affd, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 
(2005). 
132. Id. at 144, 846 A.2d at 39 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §11-304 (2002 
& Supp. 2004)). Generally, in juvenile and criminal proceedings, this stat-
ute establishes the admissibility of out-of-court statements of allegedly sexu-
ally abused children under twelve, offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted, if testified to by a physician, social worker, nurse, psychologist, or 
education professional. CRIM. PROC. § 11-304. 
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permitted the out-of-court hearsay statements of three child declar-
ants through the testimony of a social worker to whom the statements 
were made, violated the defendant's right to confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. 133 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the fo-
rensic interview statements testified to by the social worker were testi-
monial because they were prepared with the explicit purpose of 
developing the children's testimony for trial. 134 Because the state-
ments were deemed testimonial, the social worker could not testify as 
to the children's statements because the children were not unavaila-
ble to testify and the defendant had had no opportunity to cross-ex-
amine them. 135 
Mter granting certiorari, the Court of Appeals of Maryland unani-
mously affirmed the testimonial quality of the social worker's trial tes-
timony as to what the children had told her in the forensic 
interview.136 In determining that the social worker's testimony was tes-
timonial, the court found that the interview was clearly conducted 
with the express purpose of prosecuting the defendant. 137 And thus, 
"because [the social worker] was performing her responsibilities in 
response and at the behest of law enforcement, she became, for Con-
frontation Clause analysis, an agent of the police department."138 
Moreover, in response to other arguments asserted by the State, the 
court found that neither the location of the forensic interview, the 
social worker's age-appropriate demeanor in questioning the chil-
dren, nor any therapeutic goals of the interview, rendered her testi-
mony about their statements non-testimonial.139 In concluding its 
133. Snowden, 156 Md. App. 139, 152, 846 A.2d 36, 47. 
134. [d. at 157, 846 A.2d at 47. 
135. [d. at 157, 846 A.2d at 47. In so holding, the court effectively mooted a 
portion of Maryland's Tender Years Statute, which had previously provided 
for a health professional or social worker's testimony in lieu of a child 
abuse victim's testimony as admissible hearsay. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
PROC. § 11-304(c) (2001). 
136. State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64,84,867 A.2d 314, 325 (2005). 
137. [d. at 85, 867 A.2d at 326. The court found the following facts pertinent: 
the social worker's questioning was done after police questioning, the inter-
view was conducted at the request of a police detective, the social worker 
had the police report identifying the defendant as the abuser in her hand 
while interviewing the children, and the children indicated during the in-
terviews that they knew of the illegality of defendant's conduct. [d. at 84, 
867 A.2d at 325-26. 
138. [d. at 86,867 A.2d at 327. This was one of the evils that the Crawford Court 
explicitly stated that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause is meant 
to guard against. Specifically, in Crawford, the Court stated: "[i]nvolvement 
of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward 
trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse - a fact borne out 
time and again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly 
familiar." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004). 
139. Snowden, 385 Md. at 87-88, 91, 867 A.2d at 327-30. In particular, the court 
found that the location of the interview, at a juvenile assessment center, 
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analysis as to what makes a forensic interview testimonial, the court 
stated: 
[n]o matter what other motives exist, if a statement is made 
under such circumstances that would lead an objective per-
son to believe that statements made in response to govern-
ment interrogation later would be used at trial, the 
admission of those statements must be conditioned upon 
Crawforrls requirements of unavailability and a prior oppor-
tunity to cross-examine.140 
Although not a child abuse case, in the Oregon case of State v. Mack, 
a social worker's interview with a three-year-old boy who was in the 
house when the victim died was held to be testimonial.141 In reaching 
its conclusion, the Supreme Court of Oregon reasoned that by taking 
over the police interviews, the social worker was acting as a "proxy for 
the police,"142 and her interviews were therefore "effectively indistin-
guishable from the ex parte examinations that Crawford places at the 
heart of the Confrontation Clause protections."143 Analogous ratio-
nales and holdings appear to be the trend in determining the status of 
forensic interviews in child abuse cases. 144 
It is therefore probable that courts will analyze forensic interviews 
by examining the status of the person conducting the interview145 and 
provided "a controlled and structured environment for the questioning." 
[d. at 88, 867 A.2d at 328. As to the nature of the social worker's question-
ing, the court asserted that "statements made to a sexual abuse investigator 
are no less testimonial because the investigator uses non-intimidating, age-
appropriate interview techniques designed to limit re-traumatization," and 
furthermore, "[a]ny therapeutic motive, or effect, of [the social worker's] 
involvement with the children is secondary, in terms of proper Confronta-
tion Clause analysis, to the overarching investigatory purpose, and there-
fore testimonial nature, of the statements elicited during the interviews." 
[d. at 88, 91, 867 A.2d at 328, 330. 
140. [d. at 91-92, 867 A.2d at 330. The State had also attempted to argue that 
Snowden did not properly preserve his objection because the children were 
available in the courtroom and he did not expressly object to the state's 
failure to call them. [d. at 92-93, 867 A.2d at 330-31. However, the court 
refused to accept this interpretation, asserting that "Snowden's objections 
to the use of the social worker's testimony properly preserved his [Sixth 
Amendment] Confrontation Clause arguments for appellate review." [d. at 
93, 867 A.2d at 331. 
141. 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004). 
142. [d. 
143. [d. at 353. 
144. See State v. Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 185,196 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that the videotaped statements of a child's interview with a protective ser-
vices worker regarding the witnessing of a domestic assault was done with 
"the purpose of developing the case" against the Defendant and was there-
fore testimonial and inadmissible), rev'd, 696 N.W.2d 73 (Minn. 2005) 
(holding that the admission of the videotaped statements was harmless 
error). 
145. See, e.g., People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (find-
ing that a "child's statement did not constitute testimonial evidence under 
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the purpose of the interview. 146 Courts across the country, however, 
have all found forensic interviews admissible under the Sixth Amend-
ment if the interviewee testifies or, even in some courts, is available to 
testify.147 
Often, a prosecutor will want to admit the statements of a child 
made to his or her parents or to a medical professional. In terms of 
out-of-court statements made to parents, the Fifth Circuit of the Flor-
ida Court of Appeals, in a capital sexual battery case, held that a 
child's statements to her parents were non-testimonial because they 
were "spontaneous."148 Even though the child refused to testify, was 
therefore unavailable at trial, and had not been previously cross-ex-
amined by the defendant, the court ruled that because her statements 
were made "spontaneous [ly]" while being dressed by her mother, they 
were not testimonial within the contemplation of Crawford. 149 
However, in Ohio, a child victim's statements to her mother were 
ruled inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause.150 When the child began sobbing uncontrollably on the 
stand, the trial court allowed the child's mother to testify as to what 
Crawford, and therefore was not barred by the Confrontation Clause" be-
cause "[t]he child's statement was made to the executive director of the 
Children's Assessment Center, not to a government employee, and the 
child's answer to the question of whether she had an 'owie' was not a state-
ment in the nature of 'ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent''') (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004))). 
But e! People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that the videotaped statement given by the child to the police officer in this 
case was testimonial under Crawford because "the police officer who con-
ducted the interview had had extensive training in the particular interroga-
tion techniques required for interviewing children," and conducted the 
interview in a manner indicating preparation for charges and a trial, espe-
cially by asking the child what should happen to the defendant), eert. 
granted in part, No. 04SC532, 2004 Colo. WL 2926003(Colo. Dec. 20, 2004). 
See also supra note 138 and accompanying text and supra text accompanying 
note 142. 
146. See supra notes 137, 139 & 144 and accompanying text. 
147. See, e.g., People v. Argomaniz-Ramirez, 102 P.3d 1015, 1019 (Colo. 2004) 
(holding that "[b]ecause the admission of prior out-of-court statements 
made by a witness who is testifying at trial and is subject to cross-examina-
tion does not violate a defendant's right to confrontation ... the video-
taped statements of both children are admissible."); Somervell v. State, 883 
So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the videotaped fo-
rensic interview of an eight-year-old boy was properly admitted at trial 
against the defendant because the boy "was not only available to testify, he 
did in fact testify, and [the defendant] ... had a full and complete opportu-
nity to confront and cross-examine him"); Starr v. State, 604 S.E.2d 297, 299 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that videotaped interview with the victim did 
not violate the Confrontation Clause and was admissible because although 
the victim did not testify, the record showed "she was available for cross-
examination") . 
148. Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
149. [d. at 67, 69. 
150. State v. Harr, 821 N.E.2d 1058, 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 
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the child had told her under the "excited utterances" hearsay excep-
tion. 151 On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that the trial 
court abused its discretion by admitting the mother's statements be-
cause the child victim's statements to her mother "were given nearly 
two weeks after the startling event ... after the child was confronted 
by her mother for disobeying her order not to enter a stranger's apart-
ment, and only after she interrogated the child with leading ques-
tions."152 While the status of out-of-court statements to parents seems 
to hinge on the spontaneity of the statement, it is worth noting that 
out-of-court statements made to parents by children will seemingly be 
admissible if the child is available to testify with an opportunity for 
cross-examination afforded to the defendant.153 
In a case concerning a child sexual abuse victim's statements to a 
medical professional, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the 
four-year-old victim's statements to her doctor were for the sole pur-
pose of obtaining medical treatment and therefore non-testimo-
nial.154 The court reasoned that "the victim was taken to the hospital 
by her family to be examined .... [t]here was no indication of a 
purpose to develop testimony for trial, nor was there an indication of 
government involvement in the initiation or course of the examina-
tion."155 However, in the case of In re T.T., the Illinois appellate court 
refused to admit a doctor's testimony as to the child abuse victim's 
identification of the defendant because such statements dealing with 
"fault or identity" ... "implicate[d] the core concerns protected by the 
confrontation clause."156 Similar to domestic abuse cases, it seems as 
though a child abuse victim's statements will be deemed testimonial if 
made when medical personnel are involved with a police investigation 
or if made with the purpose of identifYing the defendant as the perpe-
151. Id. at 1059-60, 1064. 
152. Id. at 1067. 
153. See State v. McClanahan, No. 50866-1-1, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 597, at *1, 
*11-13 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2004) (holding that a child's statements to 
her mother were admissible under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause because the child/victim had testified). 
154. State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 291 (Neb. 2004). See also, People v. Cage, 
15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854-55, (Ct. App. 2004) (holding statements to a doc-
tor could not be expected to be used in a prosecution so were not testimo-
nial)), cm. granted and depublished by, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
155. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d at 291. 
156. 815 N.E.2d 789, 803-04 (III. App. Ct. 2004). The court, however, did find 
that the child abuse victim's statements regarding all physical symptoms do 
not violate the Confrontation Clause and are admissible. Id. See also People 
v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 265-66 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that a finding 
that a child's statements to a doctor were testimonial does not require the 
exclusion of testimony by the doctor regarding his observations and physi-
cal findings), cm. granted, No. 04SC532, 2004 WL 2926003 (Colo. Dec 20, 
2004). 
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trator, whereas statements made to medical personnel merely describ-
ing physical symptoms are deemed non-testimonial. l57 
Finally, it is not unusual for a child abuse victim to exhibit poor 
memory or freeze, or both, during his or her trial testimony. The issue 
then becomes whether just by virtue of being on the stand at trial, the 
child's out-of-court statements to others are admissible. Although still 
uncertain, recent Crawford case law addressing this scenario indicates 
that "[p]rovided that the child takes the witness stand and is subject to 
cross-examination, the child's lack of memory regarding [his or her] 
prior statements does not bar the admission of those hearsay state-
ments (including statements made during a forensic interview) ."158 
For example, in People v. Harless, the California Court of Appeals 
held that a child victim's partial memory loss on the stand did not 
violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation right. 159 
Based on the Supreme Court's exact language in Crawford,160 the Cali-
fornia court found that the victim's 
partial failure of recollection did not prevent her from ex-
plaining her prior statements, or preclude the jury from as-
sessing her demeanor and determining whether her prior 
statements or her trial testimony was more credible. Accord-
ingly, defendant had the opportunity for effective cross-ex-
amination .... 161 
157. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 112-18 
and accompanying text. 
158. Phillips, supra note 4. See also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
In Owens, a correctional officer was violently attacked with a metal pipe. [d. 
at 556. At trial, the officer testified that he remembered being visited by an 
FBI agent and identifying the defendant as the assailant. [d. However, on 
cross-examination, the officer admitted he did "not remember seeing [his] 
assailant," did not remember any other visitors during his hospital stay, and 
further, could not recall whether he had any visitors suggest that the defen-
dant was the assailant. [d. Defense counsel appealed, alleging, in part, that 
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause prohibits "testimony concern-
ing a prior, out-of-court identification when the identifying witness is una-
ble, because of memory loss, to explain the basis of the identification." [d. 
at 555. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation was not violated, stating, "[w]e do not think that a 
constitutional line drawn by the Confrontation Clause falls between a wit-
ness's forgetful live testimony ... and the introduction of the witness's ear-
lier statement. ... " [d. at 560. 
159. 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 637 (Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, 109 P.3d 68 (Cal. 
2005). 
160. The specific portion of the Crawford decision states: 
we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination 
at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the 
use of his prior testimonial statements .... The Clause does not bar 
admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial 
to defend or explain it. 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (citations 
omitted). 
161. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 637. 
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Another California case has set forth similar results. 162 
However, when a child victim takes the stand but refuses to testify 
regarding the alleged incident, if the defendant has had no prior op-
portunity to cross-examine the child, all of the child's testimonial will 
be deemed inadmissible in violation of the Confrontation Clause. 163 
As an Illinois court noted, "[c]hild sexual abuse cases present special 
problems where the child victim may be unable to testify adequately 
due to fear, guilt, or intimidation."164 Thus, even though the child 
victim is declared unavailable, the defendant is also often precluded 
from cross-examination; therefore, under Crawford, critical out-of-
court statements regarding abuse will be inadmissible. 
Ideally, analogous to a domestic abuse victim, a willing and able 
child's testimony makes Crawford a moot point for prosecutors. In real-
ity, a significant amount of what is now called testimonial evidence, 
once undoubtedly admissible in a child abuse prosecution (i.e. foren-
sic interviews), must, at least for now, meet a more exacting, yet still 
unstable, Crawford admissibility standard. 165 
B. Foifeiture by Wrongdoing: An Enduring Solution? 
The defendant who has removed an adverse witness is in a 
weak position to complain about losing the chance to cross-
examine him. And where a defendant has silenced a witness 
through the use of threats, violence or murder, admission of 
the victim's prior statements at least partially offsets the per-
petrator's rewards for his misconduct. 166 
162. People v. Phan, No. H025002, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5047, at *13-
14 (Ct. App. 2004) (The court held that because a child victim testified at 
trial, even though she had poor recollection concerning statements she 
made to an investigating police officer, Crawford was satisfied with the po-
lice officer's testimony regarding the child's statements because the victim 
testified and was subject to cross-examination. The fact that the victim had 
poor memory and was not able to be fully cross-examined did not require 
reversal.) . 
163. E.g., In Re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
164. Id. at 797. However, some courts are now making the argument that if the 
defendant has made the child unavailable, he or she may have forfeited his 
or her right to confront the children. See infra Parts IlLB., IV. 
165. But see supra notes 85 & 125 and accompanying text (discussing the contin-
ued use of a reliability standard for non-testimonial evidence). AJso, it is 
important to recognize that 
[e]ven though the confrontation right [may] no longer appl[y], 
the courts hold that the due process clause of the Constitution still 
applies, so that evidence that is unreliable on its face will be ex-
cluded. This guarantee is achieved in the federal courts through 
the application of Federal Rule 403 (identical to Maryland Rule 5-
403). 
Letter from Lynn McLain, Professor of Law and Dean Joseph Curtis Faculty 
Fellow, Univ. of Bait., Sch. of Law, to DelegateJoseph F. Valiario,Jr., Chair, 
Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 15, 2005) at 5 (on file with author). 
166. United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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Today, courts across the country are virtually, on a case-by-case ba-
sis, determining the definition of testimonial in domestic and child 
abuse cases. As a result, prosecutors must argue, on a case-by-case ba-
sis, that evidence typically utilized in domestic and child abuse cases is 
not excluded by Crawford. And the admissibility of that evidence, dis-
cussed supra, is still being resolved by the courts. 
As a result, domestic and child abuse prosecutors, legislators, law 
professors, and other legal professionals are also advocating for an 
enduring solution to such evidentiary problems spurned by Crawford. 
That solution asserts the applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
exception to as many domestic violence and child abuse cases as possi-
ble, thereby precluding a Crawford analysis to determine the admissi-
bility of a victim's out-of-court hearsay statements offered to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
In 1878, the Supreme Court of the United States pronounced the 
rule of forfeiture, a specific exception to a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause right. 167 While the Court acknowledged a 
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be "confronted with 
the witnesses against him," it went on to assert that "if a witness is 
absent by [the accused's] own wrongful procurement, he cannot com-
plain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that 
which he has kept away."168 Although Crawford has since altered Con-
frontation Clause analysis, the Court made a distinct point of uphold-
ing the rule of forfeiture in its opinion.169 Explicitly, the Court stated 
the rule of forfeiture is one which it still "accept[sJ," as it "extin-
guishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds .... "170 
"In other words, defendants should not profit from their own bad 
acts."171 
The rule of forfeiture, therefore, "should allow prosecutors to get a 
significant number of out-of-court statements of unavailable witnesses 
167. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). The "Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(6), ... codified the common law forfeiture doctrine for 
the federal courts in 1997." Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph Vallario, 
Jr., supra note 165, at 3. 
168. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158. The Court developed its analysis further, going on 
to state: 
The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person 
against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts. It 
grants him the privilege of being confronted with witnesses against 
him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist 
on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, 
their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition 
to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated. 
Id. 
169. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
170. Id. 
171. Krischer, supra note 88, at 3. 
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admitted."172 Already, since Crawford, some state courts have applied 
the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception when a defendant's conduct 
has resulted in a witness being unavailable to testify. I n The Supreme 
Court of Kansas, for example, held that the victim's statement identi-
fying the defendant as the shooter, made before the victim died, was 
admissible under Crawford because the defendant "forfeited his right 
to confrontation by killing the witness." I 74 Similarly, in People v. Moore, 
the Court of Appeals of Colorado held that the dead victim's out-of-
court statement, implicating the defendant in prior acts of domestic 
violence, was admissible under Crawford, as there was "no dispute that 
the victim was unavailable to testify because of her death and that her 
death was the result of defendant's actions."175 Thus, the court con-
cluded "that [the] defendant forfeited his right to claim a confronta-
tion violation in connection with the admission of the victim's 
statements into evidence."176 
In addition to homicide prosecutions, some legal professionals ar-
gue that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception argument logically 
extends to the admission of the out-of-court hearsay statements of do-
mestic violence and child abuse victims. 
1. "Forfeiture by Domestic Violence"177 
The domestic violence problem in this nation is astounding. As the 







Tom Harbinson, Using the Crawford v. Washington "F(JTfeiture by Wrongdoing" 
Confrontation Clause Axception in Child Abuse Cases, REAsONABLE EFFORTS 
(Am. Prosecutors Research Inst. Nat'l Child Prot. Training Ctr., Alexan-
dria, Va.) (2004), available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/publications/news-
letters/reasonable_efforts_ volume_l_number_3_2004.html. Notably, 
"[a]ll of the federal courts ... and the District of Columbia" apply Rule 
804(6), the Federal Rule of Evidence codifying the common law rule of 
forfeiture. Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph Vallario,Jr., supra note 165, 
at 3. 
See, e.g., infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. "At a minimum, the 
following states, as well as the District of Columbia, have rules, statutes, or 
case law explicitly adopting the [common law forfeiture] doctrine: Ari-
zona, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas." Letter from Lynn 
McLain, to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165, at 3. 
State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793-94 (Kan. 2004). 
People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1,5 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). 
[d. at 5. See also People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846-47, 851 (Ct. App. 
2004) (finding statements of the deceased victim, told to a police officer in 
a previous altercation admissible, because the court found that the defen-
dant forfeited his right to cross-examine the victim due to his admitted 
wrongdoing in killing the victim), cert. granted and opinion superseded by, 102 
P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004); Francis v. Duncan, No. 03 Civ. 4959 (DC), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16670, at *54-58 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23,2004) (The court held that 
the defendant forfeited his right to confront the victim because he had 
called her with death threats. Thus, the victim's grand jury testimony was 
admissible at trial, as were her statements regarding her fear of dying.). 
Term adopted from Krischer, supra note 88, at 3. 
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men are battered each year by their husbands or partners."178 Even 
more horrific is data illustrating that domestic violence is not nor-
mally a one-time occurrence. 179 And even if an abused woman at-
tempts to leave her abuser, one study reveals that of those women that 
seek medical aid, seventy-three percent were injured after leaving their 
abuser. I80 Moreover, even if a woman is brave enough to attempt to 
prosecute, sadly, the involvement of the criminal justice system is oft-
entimes not enough to prevent further abuse. 18I 
While no one wants to witness a battered woman suffer additional 
harm, the trend of an abuser to continue some sort of abuse, even 
after the criminal justice system is involved, can now perhaps work to 
the benefit of prosecutors. After Crawford, prosecutors might poten-
tially use the abuser's continued harassing, threatening, or violent be-
havior to convict the abuser without the testimony of the woman 
victim and in full compliance with the Sixth Amendment. 
The "Quincy Probation Project, which tracked court restrained 
male abusers," found that almost half of the victims were threatened 
with physical violence by their abusers if they continued cooperation 
with prosecutors.182 Not all abusers use physical threats, however, as 
the Project reported that "[£1orty-two percent of victims reported eco-
nomic threats and [twenty-five] percent were threatened with the loss 
of their children."183 Physical evidence of threats of bodily harm, eco-
nomic harm, and harm to the victim's children can be captured by 
prison phone records, e-mail.mail. caller ID logs showing numerous 
phone calls, or other witnesses who can "testify as to the content of 
specific threats made by the defendant ... [to] the victim."184 Post-
Crawford, that evidence can be used to show the victim-witness's un-
availability due to the defendant's unlawful procurement. "In short, 
prosecutors should be on the lookout for evidence that supports the 
argument that a defendant has forfeited his right to confrontation by 
his own wrongdoing."185 
178. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 632 (2000) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-395, 
§ 331 (a)(l) (1993) (citing Council on Scientific Affairs, American Med. 
Ass'n, Violence Against Women: Relevance for Medical Practitioners, 267 J. AM. 
MED. AsS'N 3184,3185 (1992))). 
179. Linell A. Letendre, Notes and Comments, Beating Again and Again and 
Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of 
Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REv. 973, 977-78 (2000). 
180. Id. at 980 (citing SUMAN KAKAR, DOMESTIC ABUSE: PUBLIC POLIcy/CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE APPROACHES TOWARDS CHILD, SPOUSAL AND ELDERLY ABUSE 37 
(1998)). Kakar cites the National Crime Survey which shows that 48% of 
domestic violence assaults go unreported. Kakar, supra. 
181. Krischer, supra note 88, at 3. 
182. Id. (citing EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 88 Games Inciardi ed., 2nd ed. 1996)). 
183. Id. (citing Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 182, at 88-89). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
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In some cases, there may be no physical evidence of a defendant's 
unlawful procurement. In such situations, the victim is already so trau-
matized, threatened, or both, by her abuser's past behavior that by the 
time the criminal justice system is involved, the abuser need not do 
anything else to procure the victim's unavailability.186 In the context 
of child abuse prosecutions, Tom Harbinson, Senior Attorney at the 
National Child Protection Center of Winona State University, argues 
that" [a] common act of procurement is procurement of unavailabil-
ity by trauma."187 Like abused children, battered women have also 
been shown to suffer from severe trauma.188 The former director of 
the Center for Applied Conflict Management at Kent State University 
stated, "[ t] he growing body of research on the psychological and phys-
iological effects of chronic trauma such as battering suggests that the 
harm to victims is even more complex than previously understood."189 
For example, "almost half of victims of battering and sexual assault 
meet the criteria for PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] ."190 
Yet, PTSD is an after-effect of acts committed during a crime that 
has already occurred, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on 
whether the rule of forfeiture applies to procurements made during 
the crime. 191 However, the underlying principle of the rule of forfei-
ture supports its application to procurements during the crime.192 As 
Harbinson explains, "[T]he critical wrongdoing the [forfeiture] ex-
ception attempts to prevent is not based on when the act occurs, but 
whether the act caused a witness to be unavailable."193 This argument 
succeeded in New Jersey, where the New Jersey Superior Court ruled 
that because the accused, while committing the abuse, threatened to 
kill his victim if she reported the abuse, he had forfeited his right to 
confront her in court.194 Prosecutors can thus argue that the trauma 
preventing a victim from testifying later at trial was directly caused by 
the past abuse inflicted by the abuser. Consequently, the abuser has 
thus forfeited his right to confront the victim. 
2. "Forfeiture by Child Abuse"195 
There are few crimes in this country more atrocious than child 
abuse. The number of child abuse or neglect victims reached 
186. [d. 
187. Harbinson, supra note 172. 
188. Jennifer P. Maxwell, Mandatory Mediation of Custody in the Face of Domestic 
Violence: Suggestions for Courts and Mediators, 37 FAM. & COUNCILIATION CTS. 
REv. 335, 341-43 (1999). 
189. [d. at 341. 
190. [d. 
191. Harbinson, supra note 172. 
192. [d. 
193. [d. 
194. State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1345-49 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). 
195. Term adapted from Krischer, supra note 88, at 3. 
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1,054,000 (fifteen of every one thousand children) in 1997. 196 Before 
Crawford, most states had child hearsay statutes that were "over-inclu-
sive," allowing for the admission of child hearsay, "not tested by cross-
examination," even if the child did not testify at trial. 197 Mter Craw-
ford, as discussed supra, a child's out-of-court hearsay statement mayor 
may not be admissible. 198 In order to combat such a tenuous standard, 
the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause 
may be the long-term solution child abuse prosecutors need to com-
bat the effects of Crawford. 
Tom Harbinson asserts 
It is common in child abuse cases for the suspect to procure 
the child's unavailability to testify whether by telling the 
child not to tell; by threatening the child, the family, or even 
pets; or by procurement through use of others, such as fam-
ily members.199 
In doing so, the abuser is attempting to "prevent the child from dis-
closing and testifying against the abuser."200 These actions arguably 
constitute a forfeiture of the defendant's right to confront his accuser, 
because the defendant has procured the witness's unavailability. 
Moreover, Harbinson argues that prosecutors should use the lan-
guage "or the acts of the accused" as set forth in Motes v. United 
States,201 to "argue the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to as many 
acts as possible."202 Specifically, Motes held that depositions not subject 
to cross-examinations and not taken under oath would violate the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause unless the witness was "ab-
sent from the trial by suggestions, procurement, or the acts of the 
accused."203 These acts include, in addition to threatening the child 
or a family member, "[t]hings the child could view as being beneficial, 
196. Andrea Charlow, A Minnesota Comparative Family Law Symposium: Race, Pov-
erty, and Neglect, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 763, 766 (2001) (citing NATIONAL 
COMMITTEE TO PREVENT CHILD ABUSE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATIS-
TICS (Apr. 1998), http://www.childabuse.com/facts97.html) . 
197. Jean Montoya, Child Hearsay Statutes: At Once Over-Inclusive and Under-Inclu-
sive, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 304, 309-11 (1999). 
198. See generally Harbinson, supra note 172 (discussing the lack of a "compre-
hensive definition of testimonial statements" from the Supreme Court in 
Crawford and possible ways to handle out-of-court hearsay statements of 
child abuse victims). 
199. Harbinson, supra note 172 (footnotes omitted) (citing various cases as ex-
amples including State v. Bewley, 68 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) 
(defendant told child victim he would kill him if he refused to submit to 
sex or told anyone); State v. Nanucke, 829 S.W.2d 445, 448-49 (Mo. 1992) 
(four-year-old sodomy victim was told she and her mother would be killed if 
she told anyone about the abuse)). 
200. Harbinson, supra note 172. 
201. 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900). 
202. Harbinson, supra note 172. 
203. Motes, 178 U.S. at 471. 
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such as gifts or money, should constitute procurement if they result in 
the child being unavailable."204 
However, asking a child not to tell, threatening the child (or family 
member) if he or she tells, or using gifts to ensure a child's silence 
often occur during the abuse. As stated previously, the Supreme Court 
has not yet ruled on whether the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception 
applies to wrongful procurement made during the crime.205 Yet, the 
purpose behind the forfeiture rule, (the removal ofa defendant's con-
frontation rights if he causes a witness to be unavailable), supports 
applying the rule to procurement during the crime.206 Thus, Harbin-
son asserts that "[i]f the accused's acts are responsible for ... the 
child refus[ing] to testifY, stating she cannot remember, or 
be com [ing] non-responsive, the requirement of unavailability should 
be considered to be met."207 And, therefore, the "State should be al-
lowed to show, in a pre-trial hearing, it has made a good faith effort to 
have the witness testifY," but the child witness is not required to be 
called at trial because the defendant has wrongfully procured the 
child's unavailability.208 
Additionally, Harbinson argues that wrongful procurement can 
make a child "unavail[able] by trauma."209 "It is widely accepted that 
[abused] children can have Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Acute 
Stress Disorder, or Traumatic Stress Disorder."21o In order to assert 
the argument that the defendant has forfeited his confrontation right, 
he suggests having a prosecutor "talk[] to family members, caretak-
ers, teachers, the child ... , and perhaps [make] a referral to a child 
clinical psychologist" to determine if the defendant's acts caused the 
"trauma that renders [the] child unavailable to testifY."211 Instead of 
allowing a defendant to argue that the child merely "froze" because of 
his or her young age, therefore barring the child's out-of-court hear-
say statements under Crawford, the argument becomes that "the acts of 
the accused ... constitute[d] procurement by trauma."212 
IV. FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING: THE MARYLAND VERSION 
While the common law rule of forfeiture was codified by Rule 
804(b )(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,213 and is therefore availa-
ble to be utilized as a valid argument for the admissibility of testimo-
nial evidence for federal prosecutors after Crawford, not all states have 
204. Harbinson, supra note 172. 
205. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
206. See Harbinson, supra note 172. 
207. Id. (footnotes omitted). 





213. See supra note 172. 
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adopted the federal rule or some form thereof.214 Consequently, do-
mestic and child abuse prosecutors in those states are left without the 
ability to argue statutory forfeiture by wrongdoing. 
It was only just recently that Maryland became one of the states to 
codify the common law doctrine of forfeiture bywrongdoing.215 Orig-
inally, the Maryland General Assembly had three Victim and Witness 
Intimidation bills before it, all of which contained the same specific 
hearsay provision: in a judicial proceeding, a "statement . . . is not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the statement is offered against a party 
that has engaged in, directed, or conspired to commit wrongdoing 
that was intended to and did procure the unavailability of the declar-
ant of the statement."216 In other words, criminal defendants could be 
found to have waived their Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
right if they, either by their own doing or through a third person, 
intentionally attempt to keep, (or succeed in keeping) or comply with 
a plot to keep, a witness from testifying against them.217 
Recently, however, the Maryland General Assembly "codified a 
more restrictive [forfeiture by wrongdoing] rule," which became appli-
cable October 1, 2005 and is only pertinent to criminal proceed-
ings.218 And "[o]n June 24, 2005, the Rules Committee revised its 
proposal to incorporate the new statute by reference and to apply the 
Committee's own version to civil proceedings."219 
Practically, under the Maryland statute, just as was proposed in the 
aforementioned bills, before a testimonial hearsay statement can 
come in under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, it has to pass 
214. But see supra note 173. 
215. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
216. GUY G. CHERRY, DEPT. OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, H.D. 248, 
2005 Leg., 420th Reg. Sess., at 2 (Md. 2005). As Professor Lynn McLain 
explains: 
The bills simply codify the common law (and common sense) 
doctrine that a party whose misconduct causes the inability of a 
witness to testify live in court forfeits the right to object on the 
ground that the party cannot cross-examine the witness. Put sim-
ply: If you created the situation, you can't complain about it. If 
you make the witness unavailable, you can't complain that you 
can't cross-examine the witness. To provide otherwise would be to 
let the intimidator/murderer profit from his own wrongdoing. 
Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario,Jr., supra note 165, at l. 
See also S. 122, 420th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005) (changing the 
seriousness of and altering the penalties for witness intimidation crimes) 
and S. 188, 420th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005) (providing forfeiture 
exception to hearsay rule in felony controlled dangerous substance case or 
case involving crime of violence). 
217. The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation only applies to criminal defend-
ants. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
218. McLain, supra note 10, at § 804(6):1 (emphasis added). 
219. Id. "The court of appeals has not yet considered either of the Committee's 
proposals." Id. 
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through a number of stages.220 To begin, ajudge must find that the 
witness (or victim) who made the statement is really unavailable to 
testify.22I Next, ajudge must find that the defendant's misconduct, or 
the defendant's direction of, or conspiracy to commit misconduct, 
procured the inability of live witness testimony.222 Finally, a judge 
must determine that the defendant had the intent of causing the wit-
ness's unavailability through his misconduct, "and as reflected in (1) 
and (2) above, that this misconduct had the intended effect."223 Addi-
tionally, even if the statement satisfies these three steps, the judge 
must then find that had the witness appeared to testify, he or she 
would have been permitted to testify to the facts contained in his or 
her statement and that the statement satisfies the reliability standard, 
mandated by the Constitution's guarantee of due process.224 
220. Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165, at 3. 
221. Id. at 4. "The grounds for unavailability are exactly the same in Maryland 
courts as in federal courts, under Maryland Rule 5-804 and Federal Rule 
804. They are well defined in the case law, which establishes the constitu-
tional requirements for meeting these criteria." Id. 
222. Id. Professor McLain explains: 
[B]oth the statute and the proposed Rule make clear that they 
will not make admissible statements of a witness who is not testify-
ing for some reason other than because the opposing party's 
wrongdoing caused the witness' unavailability. The wrongdoing 
must be tied to that party: the party will be responsible for his or 
her own actions, or the actions of others which he or she 'directed' 
or in which he or she 'conspired.' Where insufficient proof is pro-
vided to tie the wrongdoing to the opponent of the evidence, the 
statute (or Rule) will not be available to the proponent. 
McLain, supra note 10 at § 804(6):1. But c! "Where insufficient proof 
is provided to tie the wrongdoing to the defendant, the Rule will not be 
available to the prosecution." Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Val-
lario,Jr., supra note 165, at 3. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda, 208 F. Supp. 
2d 619, 624 n.2 (W.D. Va. 2001) (finding that because the witness "main-
tained that fear of [the defendant] had nothing to do with his decision not 
to testify" and because it was not clear the defendant had caused the wit-
ness' unavailability, the forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception was not 
applicable) . 
223. Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165, at 4. 
"The [statute's] language, on this point, like that of the federal rule, is in 
fact narrower than that of the common law doctrine in California, Colo-
rado, Kansas, and Texas." Id. See e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 
611 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that the rule of forfeiture applies "whether 
or not the defendant specifically intended to prevent the witness from testi-
fying at the time he committed the act that rendered the witness 
unavailable") . 
224. Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165, at 5. 
Professor McLain explains: 
[Other jurisdictions'] case law shows, without exception, that 
the judge will be required to exclude the evidence if it appears that 
the evidence is irrelevant (Md. Rules 5-401 and 5-402), or the wit-
ness had no first-hand knowledge (Md. Rule 5-602), or the witness 
was engaging in conjecture or speculation (Md. Rules 5-701 and 5-
702), or for other reasons the statement is so unreliable that its 
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While the standard of proof for admissibility of testimonial hearsay 
statements under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception was a pre-
ponderance of evidence, the statute requires the application of the 
clear and convincing evidence to the three steps discussed supra. 225 
Specifically, the judge will hear testimony, outside of the hearing of 
the jury, as to all of the preliminary facts that go to prove the witness' 
unavailability and the defendant's intentional wrongful procurement 
of the witness, and will then decide whether the statement is 
admissible.226 
Before codification, Professor McLain was a committed advocate of 
the aforementioned Witness Intimidation Bills. For example, in a let-
ter to the Chair of the Maryland House Judiciary Committee, Profes-
sor McLain argued that merely increasing the penalty will not solve 
Maryland's witness intimidation problems because" [p]rosecution of 
an intimidator is not as effective as obtaining a conviction on the origi-
nal, underlying crime."227 If a defendant succeeds in keeping a witness 
from testifying, he is then likely only facing prosecution of witness in-
timidation charges, and has succeeded in avoiding prosecution for the 
underlying crime. Moreover, Professor McLain asserted that "[t]he 
heart of these bills is the hearsay provision [forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing], which makes witness intimidation ineffective, in that it will no 
longer achieve the intimidator's goal, to escape punishment for the 
original crime."228 Thus, as long as defendants know that the procure-





admission would cause unfair prejudice to the party who caused 
the witness to be unavailable (Md. Rule 5-403). 
[d. See also supra notes 85 & 125 and accompanying text. 
Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165, at 8-9. 
McLain, supra note 10 at §804(6):1. 
McLain, supra note 10 at § 804(6):1. Interestingly, while public defenders 
and defense attorneys seem to favor a clear and convincing standard of 
proof, Professor McLain notes that the Federal Rules clearly reject a clear 
and convincing evidence standard. She points out that: 
[t]he federal Advisory Committee Note states: "[t]he usual 
Rule 104(a) preponderance of the evidence standard has been 
adopted in light of the behavior the new Rule 804(b) (6) seeks to 
discourage." Because witness intimidation and murder "strikes at 
the [very] heart of the ... [criminal] justice [system]," we do not 
want to protect those who engage in it by shielding them with a 
higher burden of proof than that which applies generally to other 
preliminary facts of admissibility, including all other hearsay 
exceptions. 
Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr. supra note 165, (al-
terations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Mas-
trangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)). See also FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(6); United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(adopting the preponderance of the evidence standard when determining 
whether a defendant waived his right to object to evidence based on his 
involvement in the procurement of the witness' unavailability). 
Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165 at 1-2. 
[d. at 2. 
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that witness's previous testimonial statement implicating them (under 
the Sixth Amendment as explicated in Crawford:), they will have "a 
great incentive to engage in intimidation, or even murder, of 
wi tnesses. "229 
However, according to Professor McLain, the statute currently in 
force in Maryland codifying the common law forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing doctrine "is far narrower than both the federal rule and the Rules 
Committee's original proposal in" three critical ways.230 To begin, 
"the Maryland statute is restricted so as to apply only to trials for cer-
tain crimes: those involving either drug distribution ('felonious viola-
tions of Title 5 of the Criminal Law Article') or those that qualify as 
'crimes of violence as defined in 14-101 of the Criminal Law Arti-
cle.' "231 Professor McLain explains that "the latter category does not 
include crimes of physical child abuse, even if resulting in serious 
physical injury; sexual child abuse; sex offenses in the third or fourth 
degree (including so-called 'statutory rape'); or second degree assault 
(which is often charged in domestic violence cases) ."232 Also, the stat-
ute provides that the other Maryland Rules will be "strictly applied."233 
Professor McLain argues that "[a]s it is obviously unlikely that an in-
timidated (or murdered) witness will appear in court to testify to the 
intimidation ... this provision will create an insuperable catch-22 for 
the proponent of the evidence .... "234 Finally, the statute utilizes the 
clear and convincing evidence burden of proof at this preliminary 
stage, clearly departing from Maryland case law.235 
V. CONCLUSION 
The impact Crawford v. Washington will have on domestic and child 
abuse prosecutions will not be fully realized until well into the future. 
In the interim, prosecutors are left to litigate the non-testimonial na-
ture of evidence that may now, under Crawford, pose a question as to 
admissibility. While one court may find a call to 911 testimonial, an-
other court, based on differing facts and analyses, may find a call to 
911 non-testimonial. 236 
Domestic and child abuse prosecutors must learn how to use the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception effectively. In domestic abuse 
cases, prosecutors should continue teaching courts about the endur-
ing effects of domestic violence, and thus argue that domestic vio-
229. Id. 
230. McLain, supra note 10 at §804(6):1. Includes a discussion of how "[t]he 
statute also contains three differences from the federal rules that are 





235. See id. See also supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra notes 96-111 and accompanying text. 
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lence inherently creates a victim's unavailability.237 In child abuse 
cases, prosecutors must attempt to build a strong case by educating 
themselves, as well as all potential persons who are involved in a 
child's life and those who will become involved upon allegations of 
abuse, regarding acts or words that may illustrate unlawful procure-
ment of the child's unavailability.238 Then, they must convince the 
courts that the defendant procured the child's unavailability. 
As a long-term solution, prosecutors, law professors, and other in-
terested parties must advocate for the use of the forfeiture by wrong-
doing hearsay exception as a method to ensure the admissibility of 
out-of-court statements made by victims and witnesses.239 While Mary-
land has codified the common law doctrine of forfeiture, the current 
statute is inadequate. It is thus important for all of those interested in 
successful domestic and child abuse prosecutions to lobby for modifi-
cations to this statute, allowing for more crimes to fall under its provi-
sions, a less strict application of the Maryland Rules of evidence, and a 
lower burden of proof. 
Nevertheless, the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception has the po-
tential to prove to be an effective tool for child and domestic abuse 
prosecutors. It is now up to prosecutors and those interested parties in 
the legal community and beyond to convince the legislatures to enact 
effective codifications of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, and to 
convince the courts that the same is a legally sound evidentiary 
argument. 
Tracey L. Perrick* 
237. Krischer, supra note 88, at 10. 
238. Harbinson, supra note 172. 
239. See supra Parts III.B and IV. 
* J.D. expected May 2006, University of Baltimore School of Law. Thank you 
to Professor Lynn McLain, for her invaluable insight and guidance. 
